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Full Idea
If epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation between mind and brain would be like nothing else in nature. After all, science recognises no other examples of 'causal danglers', ontologically independent states with causes but no effects.
Gist of Idea
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.23
A Reaction
This would be a good enough reason for me to reject the epiphenomenalist view, even if I thought it was a coherent proposal. Insofar as it proposes the existence of something (mind) with no causal powers at all, it strikes me as nonsense.